Agincourt (60 page)

2
GHQ
, p. 79.
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3 Even the venerable W&W, ii, pp. 131-2, 207-10, while drawing attention to the more fanciful descriptions of previous historians, believed that the site was unchanged. Modern military historians and television documentaries frequently make the same mistake, as does the entertaining but far too Shakespeare-reliant Centre Historique Médiévale at Azincourt.
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4
GHQ
, pp. 74, 79. The “very little valley,” which is no more than a long depression in the ground, can still be seen running parallel to the D104; the “certain wood” to the left of the English line is the woodland round Tramecourt. At this point the two armies were at right angles to their final positions.
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5 Waurin, i, p. 211, claims that the space between the woods was so narrow that only the French men-at-arms could be deployed; there was not room for the bowmen.
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6 Le Févre, i, p. 242, says that d’Albret did not arrive until later that evening, suggesting that Boucicaut alone was in charge at this stage. Waurin, who was in the French army, does not mention d’Albret’s arrival, late or otherwise.
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7 Bacquet, p. 102; Pizan,
BDAC
, p. 22.
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8 Ibid., pp. 55, 53-4.
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9 Monstrelet, iii, p. 102; W&W, ii, p. 130 n. 3.
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10
GHQ
, p. 81; le Févre, i, p. 243;
Brut
, ii, pp. 377-8; Elmham, “Liber Metricus,” p. 121.
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11 Le Févre, i, p. 243. W&W, ii, p. 141 and n. 1 wrongly translate this to mean that the prisoners should return to the king “with their masters” rather than “and to their masters,” that is, to those who had captured them.
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12 Bacquet, p. 93; Waurin, i, p. 244.
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13 See, for example, Wolfram von Eschenbach,
Parzival
, trans. with an introduction by Helen M. Mustard and Charles E. Passage (Vintage Books, New York, 1961), pp. 94, 125, 139, 166 and 127.
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14 Curry, p. 69.
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15
GHQ
, pp. 83, 87. For the long-running dispute about where the archers were placed, see W&W, ii, pp. 148-50; Bradbury,
The Medieval Archer
, pp. 129-30; Matthew Bennett, “The Battle,” in Curry,
Agincourt 1415
, pp. 24-32; Strickland and Hardy, pp. 306-10.
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16 Le Févre, i, pp. 244-5; Waurin, i, p. 203.
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17 See below, pp. 261-2, 266-7.
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18
Brut
, ii, p. 378;
GHQ
, pp. 82-3 and 82 nn. 3 and 4. Waurin, ii, p. 199, following Monstrelet, iii, p. 100, puts the duke in charge of the vanguard as early as 22 October, but le Févre, i, p. 241, who relates the same incident and was in the English army, does not make that mistake. The choice of Camoys is puzzling as he was not yet a Garter knight and his military career had been undistinguished: see
ODNB
.
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19 Bacquet, p. 104.
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20 C. Philpotts, “The French Plan of Battle During the Agincourt Campaign,”
English Historical Review
, xcix (1984), pp. 59-66; Allmand (ed),
Society at War
, pp. 194-5. This document detailing in writing not only the deployment of the French army but also the tactics to be adopted is one of only two medieval battle plans to have survived. The other extant plan was drawn up by John the Fearless on 17 September 1417 as he was approaching Armagnac-held Paris; it is given in full in Vaughan, pp. 148-50.
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21 Despite being master of the crossbowmen of France, de Rambures did not personally lead them into battle. In 1411 his predecessor in the post had been forced to concede to Marshal Boucicaut the right to muster and review archers and cannoneers, and to have jurisdiction over them (Strickland and Hardy, p. 330). At Agincourt de Rambures fought in the vanguard with the other royal officers (see above, p. 265).
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22 Louis de Bourdon’s name is variously given as Bourbon, Boisredon and Bosredon in the different sources. He is not to be confused with Louis de Bourbon, count of Vendôme.
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23 Bradbury,
The Medieval Archer
, p. 124.
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24 Despite this absence of evidence, Curry asserts that the French army was only
c.
12,000 strong (as against
c.
9000 English), a figure she is unable to substantiate. While contemporaries vary wildly in their estimates of numbers, all agree that the French greatly outnumbered the English and that this was a contributory factor in their defeat. Although they also agree that French casualties were very high, not one of them goes so far as to suggest that half of all the French forces at the battle were killed, which follows inevitably from Curry’s figures since she accepts that the dead numbered
c.
6000. Such a proportion of fatalities is unrealistic in a medieval battle. See Curry,
Agincourt: A New History
, pp. 187, 192, 233, 248.
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25 Bacquet, pp. 101, 104. Juvénal des Ursins, a dedicated Armagnac, even went so far as to suggest that there were 8000 Frenchmen in the vanguard and main battle, but claimed that they were defeated by an English army 20,000-22,000 strong! There is a useful table giving the various chroniclers’ estimates of numbers in both armies and of the dead on each side in Curry, p. 12, but it should be used with caution, as some of the figures (for example, those given for Morosini) are not accurate and others do not distinguish between the numbers of English who invaded and those present at the battle.
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26
GHQ
, p. 94; le Févre, i, p. 247; Waurin, i, pp. 206-7. Waurin’s actual numbers add up to 28,400 but a rearguard of 7600 seems appropriate, given the size of the other battles.
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27 Bradbury,
The Medieval Archer
, pp. 127-8; le Févre, i, pp. 247-8; Monstrelet, iii, pp. 103-4.
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28
St-Denys
, v, p. 558; Monstrelet, iii, pp. 103-4; Bouvier, p. 69; Bacquet, pp. 103-4. Fenin,
Mémoires
, p. 64.
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29 Waurin, i, p. 206; le Févre, i, p. 248;
St-Denys
, v, p. 562; Bouvier, pp. 68-9. Monstrelet, iii, pp. 103-4, is alone in attributing the leadership of this wing to Guichard Dauphin but his text is obviously corrupt and unreliable at this point: Waurin and le Févre both correct this to Vendôme.
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30 Bouvier, pp. 68-9;
St-Denys
, v, p. 560.
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31
St-Denys
, v, p. 560; Monstrelet, iii, p. 104; le Févre, i, pp. 85, 102, 105, 248, 288; Waurin, i, pp. 206, 213.
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32 Bacquet, pp. 112-13. This account of Agincourt, in a court case of 1460, makes it clear that Bouvier, p. 69, is right in saying that the count of Marle and his company were in the main battle, not in the rearguard as in Monstrelet, iii, p. 104, Waurin, i, p. 206 and le Févre, i, p. 248.
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33
GHQ
, p. 81; Fenin,
Mémoires
, p. 64; Allmand (ed),
Society at War
, p. 195.
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34 Le Févre, i, p. 248, using the phrase “tout le surplus des gens de guerre.”
Gens de guerre
is a general term, meaning all soldiers; it is different from
gens d’armes
or
hommes d’armes
, which specifically refers to men-at-arms.
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35
St-Denys
, v, p. 548.
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36 Ibid., v, pp. 558-60; Waurin, i, p. 206; W&W, ii, p. 53. The decision was not without precedent. Jean II had similarly dismissed most of the “poorly equipped and ill-disciplined foot-soldiers raised by the
arrière ban
” before the battle of Poitiers (1356) on the grounds that their presence at Crécy (1346) had hampered the more professional troops and contributed to the defeat. See Strickland and Hardy, p. 234.
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37 See above, pp. 59-60.
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38
GHQ
, pp. 81-3.
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39 Ibid., pp. 82-3; le Févre, i, p. 244.
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40 It was customary practice to draw the wagons into a circle behind the lines, forming an enclosure with a single entrance that could be more easily protected from enemy attack. The horses of all of the dismounted men and the non-combatants sheltered within this laager. See Strickland and Hardy, p. 225.
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41 Le Févre, i, p. 245 and n. 1. Certain manuscripts of this chronicle also add the banner of the Virgin Mary; this is also implied in
GHQ
, pp. 66-7, which refers to the army being under the protection of “the Glorious Virgin and the Blessed George.” See also above, pp. 235, 240.
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42 Le Févre, i, p. 253. Sir John Holland was allowed to use his standard as earl of Huntingdon, even though he was not yet fully restored to the earldom. See below, p. 344.
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43 Pizan,
BDAC
, pp. 152-3.
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44 Le Févre, i, pp. 245-6, 251. Curry, p. 158, wrongly translates this as “victory over
your
enemies” instead of “
our
enemies,” a subtle but important difference of emphasis. Medieval archers, unlike modern ones, used only two fingers to draw their bows. Sir James Douglas (d. 1330), Robert the Bruce’s lieutenant, was reputed to cut off the right hand or put out the right eye of any captured enemy archer, but it had been standard practice for centuries simply to execute them. See Strickland and Hardy, pp. 181, 79. After the English victory at Agincourt, the archers are said to have taunted the defeated French by sticking their two bowstring fingers up at them, a gesture which is still used vulgarly in England today to express contempt.
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45 Bouvier, pp. 67-8; Elmham, “Liber Metricus,” p. 118; Capgrave, p. 132; Baye,
Journal
, pp. 224-5; W&W, i, pp. 135-6, 136 n. 1; ii, p. 125 n. 6. An investigation into the escape was ordered on 26 October 1415:
CPR
, p. 410. De Heilly had previously been captured fighting for the Scots at Homildon Hill (1402) but had been ransomed and released: Wylie,
History of England under Henry IV
, i, p. 293; ii, p. 61.
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46
First English Life
, pp. 57-8.
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47 Le Févre, i, p. 251;
St-Denys
, v, p. 554; Basin,
Histoire de Charles VII
, i, p. 41. W&W, ii, pp. 132-3 place this parley the night before the battle and take the French accounts at face value.
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48 Le Févre, i, p. 251.
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN: “FELAS, LETS GO!”

1 Bennett, “The Development of Battle Tactics in the Hundred Years War,” p. 11. See also Jean de Bueil,
Le Jouvencel
, ed. by Léon Lecestre (Société de l’Histoire de France, Paris, 1889), ii, p. 63, where de Bueil applies this dictum to Agincourt.
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2 Le Févre, i, pp. 252-3; Bacquet, p. 93.
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3
GHQ
, p. 82;
St-Denys
, v, p. 558.
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4
GHQ
, pp. 85-7.
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5 Curry, p. 72;
Brut
, ii, p. 555.
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6 For Erpingham’s career, see Curry, “Sir Thomas Erpingham: A Life in Arms,” in Curry,
Agincourt 1415
, pp. 53-77.
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7 Brut, ii, pp. 378, 555, 596; le Févre, i, p. 253;
An English Chronicle of the Reigns of Richard II, Henry IV, Henry V, and Henry VI. Written Before the Year 1471
, ed. by Rev. John Silvester Davies, Camden Society, 64 (1856), p. 41; Allmand,
Henry V
, p. 91 n. 17.
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8 Guillaume Gruel,
Chronique d’Arthur de Richemont, Connétable de France, Duc de Bretagne (1393-1458)
, ed. by Achille le Vavasseur (Société de l’Histoire de France, Paris, 1890), p. 17;
St-Denys
, v, p. 560; Bouvier, pp. 70-1.
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9 Waurin, i, p. 213;
GHQ
, pp. 86-7.
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10 Waurin, i, pp. 206, 213; Monstrelet, iii, p. 255.
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11 The word is variously given as “nesciecque,” “nestrotque” and “nestroque” in French sources; it has been translated as “I do not know what” (that is, that Monstrelet, the reporter, did not know what Erpingham said), “Knee! Stretch!,” the option favoured by W&W, ii, p. 156, and taken to be a command to the archers to shoot because they bent their knees when they did so, or, my own preferred option, “Now strike!,” which seems the most logical command. Erpingham’s Norfolk accent clearly confounded his auditors. See Monstrelet, iii, p. 106 and n. 1; Waurin, i, p. 212; le Févre, i, p. 253; W&W, ii, p. 156 n. 6. All three chroniclers have Erpingham give his signal before the English moved to their new position, so it may have been a general order to advance rather than a command to fire.
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12
St-Denys
, v, p. 560;
GHQ
, pp. 86-7; Gruel,
Chronique d’Arthur de Richemont
, p. 17; Alain Bouchart,
Grandes Croniques de Bretaigne
, ed. by Marie-Louise Auger and Gustave Jeanneau (Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, 1986), ii, p. 253; “Chronique de Normandie de l’an 1414 à 1422,” in
Henrici Quinti, Angliae Regis, Gesta
, p. 219.
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